Threat modeling

Please use this page to discuss potential threats to web 2.0 election monitoring in general and the Twitter Vote Report in particular -- as well as potential responses.  For background, please read Tracy Viselli's Political Activism on Twitter: The Story of #dontgo (describing organized interference with a Twitter activism campaign); Sarah Lai Stirland's Ohio Secretary of State's Office Hacked (illustrating the lengths people are going to disrupt the 2008 election); and the Texas deceptive emails incident description on the Voter Suppression Wiki, where the comment describes a blended online/in-person attack.


Reporting false information


Comment: we won't be building in any authentication mechanism so we should expect some of this.  What are the processes for verifying alerts before sending them out?  What caveats do we want to give to media who are covering the live feeds?  Can we detect some patterns of abuse (e.g., "rogue SuperTwitterers"?)


Denial of service



Comment: the first step is to estimate likely load as part of a capacity plan, and then look at opportunities for automated attacks.  The best approach will be to have alternative mechnisms in place and identify up front what levels of load should trigger moving to backups.